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Abstract 
 
We introduce Grid Resources for Industrial 
Applications (GRIA), a project that aims to enable 
commercial use of the Grid. GRIA enables service 
providers to rent out spare CPU cycles, and clients to 
hire those CPU cycles. Web services play a key role in the 
architecture of GRIA, chiefly through their 
interoperability and security features - they provide a 
well-defined means of limiting clients’ access to discrete 
operations, thus allowing clients to do “work” on a 
remote application server without giving them full shell 
access to the server. In this paper, we focus on 
requirements, business processes and security, and 
interoperability and standardisation issues raised by this 
work. We also describe some of the lessons learned 
through experience of designing, implementing and 
deploying a prototype system, GRIA v1.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
GRIA is an acronym for Grid Resources for Industrial 
Applications and is a system that enables: 
•  service providers to rent out spare CPU cycles, thus 
attaining better utilization; and 
•  clients to hire those CPU cycles, thus providing them 
with access to HPC when they need it.  
In short, it aims to permit commercial use of the Grid 
in a secure, interoperable and flexible manner. 
Figure 1 shows the basic premise of GRIA for an 
example structural analysis problem using the finite 
element method (FEM). An engineer wants to outsource a 
simulation because they do not have enough internal 
resources to get it done in time. The horizontal path is the 
actual engineering simulation, and the vertical path is the 
“business” side of the outsourcing – discovery of a 
service provider, negotiation of quality-of-service (QoS) 
terms (perhaps including price, runtime, machine spec, 
software spec), agreement, running the job and 
settlement. This type of problem is typically very 
demanding of computational resources, and may not be 
run frequently - hence it is an ideal candidate for the 
computation-on-demand nature of GRIA. 
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Figure 1: Example use of GRIA
The GRIA software consists of three evolving 
prototypes: GRIA v0, GRIA v1 and GRIA v2. Each 
consists of a client and service provider component. 
GRIA v0 was a basic first attempt at providing a basic 
business process for Grid job submission. GRIA v1 
introduced a more extended business process to handle 
long-lived jobs and encompass business procurement 
processes, and is currently deployed for testing in a 
number of project partner sites across Europe. GRIA v2 is 
now in development, and with enhanced software 
architecture and a wider range of business models. 
Section 2 of this paper covers the requirements for 
GRIA, and why these are important. Section 3 covers the 
business processes we have adopted. Section 4 discusses 
our approach to security. Section 5 discusses business 
process enforcement, which is a means of ensuring that the business processes are adhered to. Section 6 covers 
interoperability, and the importance of a standards-based 
approach. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a summary of 
lessons learned and some indications of future work in 
GRIA v2, and possible contributions to standards and 
best practice in this field. 
 
2. Requirements 
 
2.1 Business Processes 
 
Our primary purpose in the GRIA project is to provide 
ways to do business on the Grid. GRIA builds on the 
work of the DISTAL project [1], which used an agent 
(rather than specifically Grid) platform to demonstrate the 
possibility of negotiating for software services. Lessons 
learned from DISTAL concerning business processes 
included: 
•  A need to keep people in the loop. Business decisions 
are complex, and people don’t want them automated. 
•  A need to use standards. Open systems improve 
exploitation and take-up. 
Business processes in GRIA have been designed to 
take account of these lessons. We aim to use existing 
business models and processes as far as possible, and 
avoid inventing new models for the Grid except where 
this is essential. Traditional business processes have 
operated successfully for many (hundreds of) years. By 
starting from existing processes, we make it easier to 
integrate Grid models into existing businesses, and reduce 
the risk that our models and processes will prove unstable 
in deployed systems. We note that the recently formed 
GGF Grid Economic Services Architecture Working 
Group [12] concurs with this philosophy, which is also 
reflected in the Computational Markets Project Grid 
Economic Services Draft Proposal to GGF 8 [7], [14] and 
in the discussion of a computational economy framework 
for the Grid by Buyya et al [6]. 
 
2.2. Security 
 
Traditionally the Grid has been used by academics 
cooperating in benign environments. As soon as we wish 
to use the Grid for commerce, we face a completely new 
set of security requirements. Indeed, we must use 
commercial grade security to remain credible. The main 
issues are discussed by one of us in the Rough Guide to 
Grid Security [22], which was motivated partly by the 
needs of a commercial grid, and has guided the 
development of GRIA. 
In the commercial Grid world, a service provider’s 
primary concern is to provide computational resources to 
traceable and creditworthy users: 
•  For traceability, mutual authentication of client and 
service provider identities is paramount. 
•  All communication must be over secure channels, so 
that eavesdroppers cannot read or alter the data. 
•  A service provider must protect itself from breaches 
such as hacking and denial of service attacks. 
•  The system must support “security in depth” - 
employing a succession of barriers that limit the 
damage should any one barrier be breached. 
•  The system must not undermine existing security 
barriers. In particular, we must operate with 
conventionally configured firewalls, and not rely on 
tunnelling around them. 
•  We must base the system on off-the-shelf 
components that are mature and regularly patched. 
 
2.3. Interoperability 
 
GRIA is intended to provide a means to make money 
by exploiting a market in grid-based computation, as a 
consumer or a supplier to this market (or possibly both). 
To maximise the potential size of this market, we must 
make the GRIA technology as interoperable as possible. 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
In summary, GRIA had to be: 
•  conservative in its business models and processes; 
•  secured to normal commercial standards; and 
•  open and interoperable. 
We now examine how we sought to meet these 
requirements, and what lessons we believe can be learned 
from our experiences. 
 
3. Business models and processes 
 
3.1. Negotiation model 
 
The first business process investigated and 
implemented in GRIA v0 and v1 is a traditional Invite–
Tender–Contract model. A client invites a number of 
service providers to tender for a particular piece of work. 
The service providers respond with tenders that indicate a 
run time for the work, and how much it will cost the 
client. The client selects the tender that best suits their 
needs, and exchanges contracts with the service provider 
to confirm the terms are accepted by both sides. Once 
both sides have digitally signed the contract, the job is 
submitted and run. 
Our implementation has the (human) end-user decide 
which proposal to accept, leaving them in control of the 
trade-off between performance, cost and their level of 
trust in the service provider. This is consistent with our experience from the earlier DISTAL project, where users 
rejected the (apparently more attractive) notion that these 
decisions could be taken by software agents. 
 
3.2. Quality of service models 
 
The quality of service model used with the above 
negotiation process is based simply on the response time 
for a single job. We express quality of service as a set of 
obligations accepted by each party: 
•  The client must state the amount of work needed for 
their job, when they will submit the input data, and 
when they will collect the output. 
•  The service provider agrees to allocate a resource 
capable of delivering the required amount of work 
between submission and collection time, and to store 
the output until the collection time. 
The noteworthy point about this approach is that we do 
not make absolute guarantees that resources will be 
available to run jobs by a certain time. We believe that 
this is not feasible in a real commercial environment. 
Instead, the parties state their obligations, and agree what 
should occur if those obligations are or are not met. This 
is a robust approach that recognises that guarantees are 
not absolute, and uses conventional business practices to 
address this. 
To operate our quality of service model, we needed a 
measure of computational work that is independent of the 
resource that will be used, but allows the service provider 
to calculate the run-time and decide whether they can 
meet their side of the agreement. We used a very simple 
model in which the execution time for a job on a given 
machine is simply: 
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where W is the workload of the client’s problem, and R is 
the relative performance of the target machine. We can 
measure  R for a given machine by running a 
representative benchmark for which we know W. We can 
then estimate W for a given job from an estimate (or 
measurement) of Te on a machine where R is known, and 
thus we can estimate run-time on any other machine. This 
allows the service provider to determine whether any of 
their machines is acceptable under a given quality of 
service agreement. 
In GRIA v0, the client-side estimate of W was 
obtained by asking the user for an estimate of run-time on 
their own machine, which the GRIA client had 
benchmarked in the background. In GRIA v1, we have a 
more sophisticated model in which W and R are both 
vectors, covering different aspects of machine 
performance (processing, disk I/O, and memory 
bandwidth), and the W vector is estimated using a neural 
network developed by NTUA [10], [11], to model our 
applications (FEM analysis and 3D video rendering). 
In both GRIA releases, we use a simple model of 
resource availability to estimate the queuing time for a 
non-dedicated compute cluster controlled by Condor or 
PBS. This model is also used to limit the total amount of 
work sent to the cluster by GRIA. 
 
3.3. Discovering service providers 
 
In real-life, organisations do not allow staff to engage 
arbitrary service providers to fulfil their day-to-day needs. 
This is certainly true for services involving commercially 
sensitive data. In sectors such as health-care, where 
personal data is involved, allowing an arbitrary service 
provider to be used as a processor of this data is actually 
illegal under the relevant EU Directives [16]. 
Instead, most organisations maintain an “approved 
supplier list”, of suppliers with which the organisation has 
negotiated acceptable terms including price, quality and 
(where appropriate) confidentiality, etc. These suppliers 
have been vetted and approved, and possibly preferential 
rates negotiated with the supplier. Anyone within the 
organisation that needs to purchase a particular item or 
service should use an approved supplier, as these have 
been vetted and approved. 
We use approved supplier lists in GRIA to record the 
relationships that a client organisation has with approved 
service providers. This fits our philosophy of modelling 
existing B2B processes as far as possible. For users, the 
approved supplier list acts as an internal registry that they 
can consult to find potential service providers. 
This is not to preclude the use of external (or public) 
registries. In GRIA, these are a source of classified 
information about available services from which to 
populate the approved supplier list. 
 
3.4. Financial processing 
 
In GRIA we have assumed that all financial 
processing, from the credit checks performed when a 
client is first encountered, through to the transfer of 
transactions to the bank for processing, is out of band. 
The DISTAL project [1] taught us that humans would 
much rather be responsible for decisions involving credit 
checks and credit limits, as an automated process cannot 
take responsibility. You cannot sue a computer because it 
gave a dishonest customer a large credit limit! 
Clearly, there is no need to invent a new banking 
system for the Grid (given that we are using fairly 
conventional business processes). Because of this, GRIA 
does not provide accounting facilities beyond statements 
of usage (from which bills may be generated) and 
logging.  
3.5. Lessons learned 
 
The main lessons learned about Grid business 
processes in GRIA v1 are as follows: 
•  emulating existing processes where possible is the 
best approach; but 
•  the Invite-Tender-Contract model is probably too 
heavyweight to be used on a “per job” basis. 
By emulating existing business processes, we have 
found it relatively easy to integrate with existing 
infrastructure, which means one doesn’t have to develop 
Grid alternatives for things like banking services, etc. 
However, having the user “sign-off” each individual 
job, with an exchange of signed QoS contracts, is not a 
good idea unless each job is very expensive. It may be 
sensible where a job involves heavy use of a high-end 
commercial software package, but this is not the case in 
the GRIA project, where the cost of each job can be as 
little as €1. In these circumstances, we need lightweight 
business processes where a client can pre-negotiate 
quality of service, after which they can just submit and 
run jobs, the QoS terms having been already taken care 
of. 
We are investigating solutions to this problem for 
GRIA v2. We are currently focusing on a “resource 
rental” model for this multiple-job type of QoS 
agreement. Here, the QoS is agreed over a particular time 
period, for a particular total workload, and the client (or 
their delegate) can submit as many jobs as they like 
within these limits. The cost to the client may be 
presented as a tariff: cost per unit of workload, for 
instance. 
 
4. Security Features 
 
4.1. Rings of Security 
 
In accordance with our “security in depth” philosophy, 
GRIA provides multiple “rings of defence”. In most 
cases, this is achieved simply by adopting solutions from 
the world of web-based e-Commerce systems, and 
working within, rather than around the operational 
security best practices developed there. 
GRIA uses mature, off-the-shelf software components 
as its application container and web server such as the 
Apache HTTP Server [3]. It is of primary importance that 
the user-facing applications are mature, well patched, and 
are kept up to date using a prompt security advisory 
service [4]. A critical feature of GRIA is that we have not 
modified or “Grid-enabled” any of the components it is 
based upon. If vulnerabilities are discovered, GRIA users 
can use the patches from Apache – they don’t have to 
wait for a GRIA-specific version of the patch to appear. 
We advocate that GRIA services and associated 
resource clusters be placed in a De-Militarised Zone 
(DMZ). Again, this is conventional best practice for most 
web-based business systems. 
On the client side, we expect that the user’s system 
will be behind a firewall configured to allow outgoing 
connections only. GRIA, like other recent Grid systems is 
based on Web Services, using SOAP messages to 
implement an RPC model of service invocation. Unlike 
some other Grid systems, GRIA’s invocation mechanisms 
operate over a standard HTTPS transport. GRIA v1 
services are designed so that each SOAP invocation is 
reasonably short-lived, so we don’t have problems with 
TCP connection time-outs, and there are no “call-backs” 
from the service to the client (e.g. for notification). These 
features mean that GRIA works with conventional 
HTTPS proxies and firewall configurations. There is no 
need for the system administrator to open any non-
standard tunnels in the firewall, and client-side users 
continue to benefit from its protection. 
GRIA also uses both transport- and message-level 
security. At the transport level, GRIA (through Apache) 
enforces mutual authentication of HTTPS connections. 
This ensures that an unauthenticated client cannot access 
a GRIA service, as the HTTPS connection will be 
dropped in the SSL handshake, before any data reaches 
the Web Service message processor. 
Once the HTTPS connection is established with an 
authenticated user, message-level security is used to 
enable separate authentication (and non-repudiation) of 
message content. GRIA v0 and v1 require that each 
message is signed in conformance with the W3C SOAP 
Digital Signature Extensions Note [21]. GRIA v2 will 
support end-to-end message authentication and possibly 
encryption using the WS-Security standards [26]. This 
will enable greater flexibility for intermediary message 
processors and action delegates. 
 
4.2. Minimal authorisation 
 
GRIA uses a so-called “minimal authorisation” 
security paradigm. Traditional academic Grids have 
supported shell access (or something equivalent), 
whereby the user accessing a remote resource can run 
essentially any command on the remote machine. This 
undermines the philosophy of “security in depth”, in 
which one aims to restrict the user’s rights to the 
absolutely [22]. 
On a commercial Grid, users are much less likely to 
know each other personally, and may have divergent (or 
even conflicting) interests. This means that we cannot 
rely on collaboration or goodwill to regulate behaviour. 
Under these circumstances we need to practice “minimal 
authorisation” - limiting user access to specific resources, rather than allowing them arbitrary rights associated with 
shell access. Web Services provide just this - a means of 
limiting clients’ access to well-defined operations, thus 
allowing users to do “work” without giving them full 
shell access to the application server. In an academic 
Grid, this may be seen as a limitation, but for a 
commercial Grid, it is an essential security feature. 
 
4.3. X.509-compliant PKI 
 
Based on the requirement for commercial grade 
security, subscriber identification, privacy, and non-
repudiation, GRIA has implemented and operates an 
open, fully X.509 compliant, Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI).  
Full compliance with the X.509 standard requires a 
Certification Policy (CP) defining the requirements of the 
PKI, and the constraints that must be met by its 
implementer(s). The GRIA PKI is intended to be open, so 
the CP allows for multiple Certification Authorities 
(CAs), provided they operate in accordance with the CP. 
Each GRIA site can choose which certification authorities 
to trust, and there is no need for “cross-certification” to 
support this. We anticipate that in future, GRIA user 
communities will choose their own CP and CAs. 
The GRIA Project’s own Certification Policy defines 
the rules for the GRIA PKI, and follows the 
recommendations of the IETF RFC for Certificate Policy 
and Certification Practices Framework [18]. (We conform 
to the 2002 version of RFC 2727, the latest at the time of 
authorship of the CP and the CPS. This is now obsolete 
and replaced by RFC 3647, listed in the references.)  
The emphasis of the GRIA Project CP is on security, 
user education and support, rather than scalability or cost. 
This is acceptable within the project, where the systems 
are prototypes, users may be unfamiliar with PKI 
operation, and we need a high level of security and 
mutual trust. Obviously, we do not expect commercial 
markets to operate their PKI in the same way, but the 
GRIA technology is flexible enough to handle this. 
Finally, GRIA does not support the use of Grid proxy 
certificates. The August 2003 Internet Draft concerning 
proxy certificates [19] defines a proxy certificate as: 
•  “…a certificate that is derived from, and signed by, a 
normal X.509 Public Key End Entity Certificate or 
by another Proxy Certificate for the purpose of 
providing restricted proxying and delegation within a 
PKI based authentication system.”  
Our main concern with proxy certificates is that they 
give (albeit temporary) credence to a private key that may 
not be under the associated user’s control. For 
commercial use, where protection of identities and private 
keys is paramount, this is unacceptable. We therefore 
cannot use GSI-enabled protocols such as HTTPG [17] or 
Grid-FTP [15], as end-to-end authentication is needed for 
all process invocation. GRIA performance suffers 
somewhat as a result, but given the security drawbacks, 
we cannot permit the use of proxy certificates in a 
commercial environment. 
 
4.4. Lessons learned 
 
The main lesson from the GRIA security 
implementation work is that industrial and commercial 
users are far happier to accept a Grid that uses existing 
best practice, even if this means we are unable to exploit 
all the performance advantages of service-initiated 
messaging through special firewall tunnels, GSI-enabled 
protocols, and shell access (or equivalent). 
Having said that, we recognise that application 
developers do not like the restriction to bilateral client-
server interactions enforced by GRIA. We do not plan to 
address this in GRIA v2, but we are investigating 
alternative ways to support peer-to-peer application 
topologies without losing control in the UK E-Science 
project “The Semantic Firewall” [23]. 
 
5. Business process enforcement 
 
5.1. Workflow enforcement 
 
Given that we are operating a commercial service, 
with high security requirements, we must be able to 
control who can do what, and in which context. For 
example, we cannot allow the running of a computational 
job until there has been an agreement that payment will 
be made for the computation. 
In GRIA, workflow enforcement provides this link 
between business process and security. Our approach has 
been to model all business processes as a hierarchy of 
bilateral “conversations” between clients and service 
providers. We then implemented a “conversational 
authorisation” system to support dynamic authorisations 
containing who can do what, and in which conversation. 
An operation will be executed for a particular user in a 
particular context only if an authorisation matching this 
specification is present. All other situations result in 
denial. Hence business process workflows are enforced. 
Conversational authorisation is grounded in the Web 
Service interface of a GRIA service. It governs which 
exposed operations are accessible to a user in a particular 
conversation. A WSDL interface typically exposes many 
operations, all of which may normally be executed by a 
user. Our solution regulates the use of these Web Service 
operations to enforce the business workflow. 
The operations themselves may open and close 
authorisations – for example, an upload of data may be 
permitted only once, and must precede the running of a job. The first thing the “UploadData” operation does is 
check that there is an open authorisation to upload data 
for the quoted user and conversation. Once the data is 
successfully uploaded, it closes the authorisation to 
upload data in the same conversation, and opens 
authorisations for subsequent operations (for example 
running a job). Thus, the workflow sequence is enforced. 
 
5.2. Contexts 
 
We have found that hierarchical contexts are 
extremely useful for representing business processes. At 
each level, there is a well-defined subject and 
conversational history that the context refers to. This 
approach is strongly based on existing business 
processing mechanisms. 
For example, a B2B relationship is likely to involve a 
client opening an account with a service provider 
organization. The account is the subject of a conversation 
at this level, and the account number is the service 
provider's identifier for that particular relationship – in 
other words a context identifier. Within the context of this 
account, orders are raised by the client, and within an 
order, there may be many items, each of which may be 
delivered and invoiced separately. Thus there is a 
hierarchy of contexts, allowing each individual document 
to be traced back to the top-level account. 
To represent this in GRIA, we use three nested levels 
of conversations, an example of which is shown in Figure 
2: 
•  a conversation referring to the account opened by a 
Budget Holder client with a service provider; 
•  a conversation referring to a quality of service 
agreement between a User client and service 
provider, which covers a job (or in GRIA v2, jobs) 
that will be run on an account; and 
•  conversations referring to individual jobs and data 
stores, that use resources allocated under a quality of 
service agreement. 
 
  Account - owner = Budget Holder, ID = 1, parent = none
  Negotiation - owner = U1, ID=10, parent = 1
  Run -
    owner = U1
    ID = 100
    parent = 10
  Run -
    owner = U1
    ID = 101
    parent = 10
  Run -
    owner = U1
    ID = 102
    parent = 10
  Run -
    owner = U1
    ID = 103
    parent = 10
  Negotiation - owner = U2, ID=20, parent = 1
  Run -
    owner = U2
    ID = 200
    parent = 20
 
Figure 2: Account context hierarchy 
This forms a tree-like structure representing the 
relationship between a client and service provider. At any 
instant, the contextual hierarchy captures the status of the 
client-server relationship (e.g. outstanding jobs or total 
amount owed). 
To represent contexts, we have found it useful to 
borrow an established method from traditional business 
processes – “our-ref”, and “your-ref”. This is a simple but 
effective means of allowing two communicating parties 
keep track of a particular subject. The key point is that in 
each bipolar communication, there are two references, 
one owned by each side respectively. Each side owns, 
uses and manages one reference ID (our-ref), and quotes 
the other (your-ref) back to its owner. Because each side 
is responsible for their own reference, they can ensure 
that this reference is unique within their own domain. 
Thus we do not need a global scope or schema for 
representing context. Of course, this tried and tested 
method has worked for many years in paper-based 
business processes. 
When a new conversation is started, the conversational 
authorisation system supplies the conversation ID for it, 
and the service provider adopts it as their service provider 
reference. 
 
5.3. Delegation 
 
Each conversation has an owner who can extend 
access rights to other parties through delegation. This is 
the mechanism by which authority for a particular action 
in a particular context is conferred on a user. GRIA v1 
provides a web-based account management portal, 
operated by the service provider (using certificate-
authenticated HTTPS), enabling the top-level 
conversation owner to access and manipulate delegated 
access rights on their account. 
An example of delegation and its relationship to the 
hierarchical context model is illustrated in Figure 3. Customer
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Figure 3: Delegation 
The Budget Holder has opened an account with a 
service provider, and this is the top-level conversation. If 
the Main User wishes to negotiate QoS with the service 
provider, they must have permission from the Budget 
Holder. The account manager allows the Budget Holder 
to communicate this to the service provider by opening an 
authorisation on the account for the Main User to access 
the “OpenQoS” operation. Thus they can delegate 
responsibility for negotiating QoS on their behalf. 
When the Main User opens a QoS negotiation, they 
quote the account number to the service provider. The 
service provider is then able to check this against their list 
of authorisations, and if the main user is permitted, a new 
conversation is created, whose parent conversation is the 
account. Given the hierarchical nature of the contexts, 
when the time comes to send the Budget Holder a bill, it 
is a simple matter to collect the relevant information as 
the service provider must only recursively look for is the 
set of unsettled children of the account. 
Now further suppose that the job is run on behalf of 
the Customer. The Main User may now open an 
authorisation for a Customer to examine the results of the 
job, thus delegating access to the Customer. This is done 
exactly the same way the Budget Holder delegated access 
to the account for the Main User. 
 
5.4. Lessons learned 
 
The main lessons learned from our work are that it is 
possible to construct dynamic authorisation mechanisms 
that relate easily to business processes. In doing this, we 
have not found it necessary to use role-based access 
control. The usual reason for using role-based 
mechanisms is the need to manage access rights for large 
numbers of users, but in GRIA this becomes a fully 
distributed responsibility. 
Neither have we used centralised authorisation 
services in GRIA. At present, we cannot see any use for 
such services. Business process enforcement is a matter 
for the participants in a process, and few businesses 
would trust an external agency to handle this, especially a 
centralised service that could become the focus for 
criminal attacks. 
Thus, a distributed process-oriented authorisation 
scheme similar to our dynamic conversational model 
seems inevitable. We can envisage changing some details 
(e.g. adding support for roles), but see no benefits in a 
centralised approach. 
 
6. Interoperability issues 
 
GRIA aims to contribute to standards, but not by 
trying to promote small changes in existing Grid 
specifications (e.g. by contributing to the Resource 
Specification Language used in the Globus Resource 
Allocation Manager (GRAM) [13]). Instead, we are 
focusing on emerging activities to understand and express 
standardisation requirements in the Semantic Web and 
Semantic Grid [20] communities. We believe that this 
approach will lead to a mature understanding of needs, 
which can then feed into next-generation standards for 
things like resources, quality of service and security. 
A number of challenges for commercial Grids in 
industrial applications have been presented at GGF 9 in 
[9]. The focus for that discussion was the challenges 
coming from business modelling for the representation of 
resources, scheduling and quality of service. This is our 
current focus in GRIA v2, but we see that in the longer 
term we will need to reflect processes (and especially 
process enforcement) in security standards, etc. Other 
semantic-level standards that will be of interest to GRIA 
are those for describing business processes and function, 
such as BPEL4WS [5], and DAML-S [8], [2]. 
We also perceive that the GRIA approach for 
contextualising business processes is consistent with the 
ideas for endpoints from the WS-Addressing [24] 
proposals. It is also consistent with the recent proposals 
from IBM and Argonne National Laboratory for a Web 
Services Resource Framework [25]. We believe that it 
will be both feasible and interesting to evolve GRIA in 
this direction, and at some future time demonstrate 
interoperability with a Globus 4 Grid. 
Ultimately, we believe that a client organisation should 
be able to discover a service provider that may suit their 
needs, and download from that service provider a 
specification of how the service provider wants to do 
business. This implies standardisation over the 
descriptions even of service function. 
 7. Conclusions 
 
The main conclusions of our work on GRIA are as 
follows. 
Firstly, in an industrial Grid, one must start from 
business processes that industry is used to, and avoid 
extending them except where absolutely necessary. This 
approach makes the Grid more accessible and acceptable 
to industry, and also makes it easier to integrate the Grid 
with industry’s existing infrastructure and processes. 
Secondly, an industrial Grid must be based on existing 
best practice in security to gain acceptance. Our findings 
show both this goal is achievable, but that there may be 
some drawbacks, especially for performance. However, 
on an industrial/commercial Grid, security must always 
come first. 
Finally, an industrial Grid will depend heavily on 
semantics to achieve interoperability, especially at the 
level of business processes and corresponding security 
mechanisms. We expect that progress in Semantic Web 
and Semantic Grid standards will provide a platform for 
the next generation of lower-level standards for resources, 
quality of service and security. 
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